Diarmuid Breatnach
(Reading time: 6 mins.)
Recent revelations about British intelligence services being in possession of film evidence of Martin McGuinness being a leading member of the IRA but choosing not to prosecute adds to many suspicious incidents over the years regarding this man.
Indeed this is but one additional item to add to many things that have raised suspicions over the years. He had been arrested in the Irish State in 1972 but his sentence from the Special Criminal Court was only six months; however in 1974 he received the more usual 12 months’ jail.
However, over the years in the Six Counties he received a string of convictions for assault on police and for obstruction, for which fines were his only punishment, despite the State being aware of his position within Derry’s Provisional IRA, failing even to convict him of membership in 1976.
Nor was there ever an attempt on his life though he moved around openly in Derry; how he was awarded £2,000 damages for an incident with British soldiers at a checkpoint – a practically daily occurrence for nationalists in the Six Counties – and that he had made the claim!
Most damning of all was the very low level of armed resistance actions in the area over which he was commander of the Provisional IRA.
McGuinness went from crude militaristic outlook to belief in electoral politics and the pacification process without a clear track of his progress (unlike that of Adams). No evidence of gradual change or of Road to Damascus conversion though he was reported favourable to a truce in 1972.
The suspicions about McGuinness can be added to the known cases of agents and informers in top levels of the military and political leadership of the Provisionals: Freddie Scappaticci, Denis Donaldson, Martin Gartland. Derry in particular had Raymond Gilmour and Frank Hegarty.
“Spies and informers” have been quoted by many over the years as the reason for failure thus far to achieve Irish independence; indeed these complaints go back at least as far as the United Irishmen and as recently as July 2020, Denis McFadden bugged meetings of the New IRA for his handlers.
THE REALLY FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS
The fundamental problems in the Republican movement go far beyond the serious enough ones of faulty security permitting influx of agents and recruitment of informers. The very strategic concept of the 30 Years War was at fault which facilitated the subsequent sellout in the Pacification Process.
If one were planning a campaign to break Ireland from colonial occupation and control by the British ruling class, a major military power, why would one largely confine it to one-sixth of the nation? And worse still, one-sixth divided between nationalist and unionist communities?
One might say in its favour as the choice of main zone that the contradictions in the British colony were the most acute there, the Catholic population being discriminated against socially, politically, economically and culturally. And they were already in struggle for civil rights.
And that might be an important reason for diverting a certain amount of resources there. But the bald fact remains that logically the struggle against the British ruling class could not succeed if it were largely confined to that area.
Yet that is what the Provisionals did as they split from the organisation that then became known as “the Officials” in 1970. Nevertheless by 1972 they were proclaiming on their newspaper’s front page that Blian an Bhua, “the Year of Victory” was at hand.
In fact they appeared so sure of the impending victory that it seems they were attracted by the film company’s plans to record them – they would have a film for general release at the same time as their victory parade, star-studded (well, McGuinness-studded anyway).
What could have induced them to think that victory was imminent? Only two possible imaginary scenarios:
- That the British didn’t really want to remain and by 1972 were beginning to get a good taste of what hanging on to the colony was going to cost them, or
- That the Irish national ruling class were going to step in and help ease the British out in the cause of national unification.
If they believed the first, which a lot of people believe even today, they were not carrying out a historical analysis. At every possible juncture when they could have left, the British colonialists dug in deeper.1 Which is what they were doing in 1972, the bloodiest year of the War.
If the Provisionals considered the second a real possibility, they would have had to ignore the history and current reality of the Irish Gombeen2 ruling class, a totally foreign-dependent neo-colonial class.
Of course, to fight the war to win, they would have had to extend the struggle to the whole of the country and also build alliances with movements of nations within Britain and with the British working class, in particular through the mostly working-class Irish diaspora there.
Extending the struggle to the whole nation would have meant taking on the State, its social police the Catholic Church, equality for women, right to divorce, decriminalisation of contraception and pregnancy termination, of LGB, secularisation of education, full state health care …3
No. While Adams and later McGuinness recognised the fallacy of a quick victory in the occupied Six Counties, instead of extending the struggle to the whole 32 Counties, they opted instead for “the long war” – long and unwinnable (which made it ripe for a pacification process in a few decades).4
But this too had to be based on one or both of the same two presumptions:
- The British didn’t really want to remain and by 1972 were beginning to get a good taste of what hanging on to the colony was going to cost them, or
- The Irish national ruling class were going to step in and help ease the British out in the cause of national unification.
And those presumptions were just as fallacious for a long war as they had been for a short victorious one.
The other fundamental weakness in the Republican movement that made victory impossible in this scenario and by no means confined to the Republican movement’s leadership, is that of: “the leadership is right, they know best and only trouble-makers (or cowards) question them.”
Clearly an organisation must have discipline and at certain times decisions arrived at democratically or otherwise in emergency situations have to be carried out without a debate. But they should be open to discussion beforehand if possible and certainly to review afterwards.
That was not the style of the Provisionals and people disagreeing with the leadership’s line were labelled as “troublemakers”, censored from the letters page of their newspaper and isolated by warning others not to associate with the critics – for fear they’d be considered dissenters also.
And since the leadership was ‘always correct’ it followed that the organisation was always correct too. Critics had to shut up or face the fact of exile to the cold outside the movement. And why unite with other groups in a broad front when your leadership is the only correct one`?
All this happened in the past and the Provisionals are no more, just the SF electoral party now.
However, the majority of the current movement of ‘dissidents’, far from carrying out a critical review of past operational principles, seems to have to have learned nothing and to be happily replicating the style and content of the organisation from which many split.
End.
FOOTNOTES
1Even after the 1916 Rising, the electoral massacre of their client ‘nationalist’ party in the 1918 General Elections and the War of Independence 1991-1921, the British ruling class still insisted on retaining Ireland within the Commonwealth structure and even then, just in case, retaining six counties in a direct colony.
2From “gaimbín” in the Irish language, used to describe the opportunist creditors and land-buyers during and in the aftermath of The Great Hunger, now describing an Irish foreign-dependent capitalist class.
3Provisional Sinn Féin not only did not lead those struggles but in some cases opposed them.
4A long armed resistance war entails a heavy toll on the fighters (in deaths and jailings) and their community and, as the decades go by without any sign of victory, war-weariness sets in creating fertile ground for growing a pacification process.
SOURCES
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